

Message Text

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BOGOTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 04121

NODIS

FOR ATHERTON FROM SECRETARY

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), PFOR, SS, MO, AG

SUBJECT: SPANISH SAHARA -- SUGGESTED TALING POINTS FOR ATHERTON'S

USE WITH HASSAN AND BOUMEDIENE (S/S 7603653)

1. BELOW ARE TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR USE WITH HASSAN AND BUUMEDINE. IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: A. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT YOU TRY TO MAKE THIS AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE A TRIP ON THE SAHARA AND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE A TRIP TO REVIEW THE FULL RANGE OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE TWO COUNTRIES. ROBINSON'S VISIT TO ALGIERS WILL HELP GIVE IMPRESSION OF BROAD REVIEW, AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO GIVES BASIS FOR DESCRIBING PURPOSE AS PERIODIC EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ALL MATTERS OF GENERAL CONCERN IN GHE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND ON BILATERAL MATTERS. IDEALLY, YOUR CONVERSATIONS SHOULD BE AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER MATTERS AND NO MORE THAN ONE-THIRD SAHARA. GIVEN IMPORTANCE OF PRESENT PERIOD FOR FUTURE OF ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS, YOU CAN LEGITIMATELY MAKE A POINT OF WANTING TO HAVE NORMAL CONSULATATION AS WE HAVE PERIODICALLY IN PAST.

B. ABOVE APPROACH WILL BE IMPORANT IN SUPPORTING YOUR EFFORT TO ESTABLISH THAT PARTIES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BUILD HOPES THAT THE US WILL PROVIDE A SOLUTION. AS YOU KNOW, YOU ARE NOT RPT NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO ROLE AS MEDIATOR IN ANY WAY. THIS MEANS YOU WILL HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN ANY DISCUSSION OF REFERENDUM OR SELF-DETERMINATION. I BELIEVE WITH HASSAN YOU SHOULD REFER

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BACK TO HIS COMMENT ABOUT FINDING AN "ELEGANT SOLUTION" AND

ASK WHAT HE HAD IN MIND RATHER THAN INTRODUCING IDEA OF SELF-DETERMINATION FORMULA AND RISKING APPEARANCE OF EITHER TRYING TO PUT WORDS IN HIS MOUTH OR TRYING TO DEVELOP A FORMULA YOURSELF.
C. YOUR SHOULD AVOID APPEARANCE THAT THE US IS PUTTING PRESSURE ON MOROCCO. FOR INSTANCE, THERE SHOULD BE NO INDICATION THAT WE ARE THREATENING MOROCCO WITH REDUCTION OF OUR AID. YOU MAY SAY THAT IT WOULD HELP WITH OUR CONGRESS IF MOROCCO COULD BE CLEARLY SEEN AS THE VICTIM OF AGRESSION.

2. FOR BOUMEDIENE: BEGIN TEXT.

-- SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS VERY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

-- BECAUSE OF HIS HIGH REGARD FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP, THE SECRETARY IS CONCERNED THAT THERE CONTINUE TO BE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS AND POLICIES IN BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AREAS. HE WANTS TO BE SURE THAT THERE ARE NO MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS PURSUING IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR NORTH AFRICA IN THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD.

-- (AS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN STATE OF PLAY ALONG LINES OF MESSAGES FOR ASAD SINCE OUR LAST COMMUNICATION WITH BOUMEDIENE ON THIS SUBJECT AND TELL HIM HOW WE PLAN TO PROCEED IN THE COMING WEEKS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT (A) WE ARE IN NO WAY ATTEMPTING TO DIVERT ALGERIAN ATTENTION FROM THIS CRITICAL PROBLEM AS ZEGHAR INTIMATED BOUMEDIENE SUSPECT, (B) WE DO NOT ACQUIESCE IN THE ISRAELI STRATEGY OF TRYING TO BUY TIME THROUGH 1976, AND (C) WE APPRECIATE BOUMEDIENE'S UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AND HOPE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT TOGETHER ON THIS PROBLEM IN A COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST. AS NOTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, YOU SHOULD DEVELOP THIS SUBJECT FULLY SO AS TO MAKE IT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE CONVERSATION AND GIVE BOUMEDIENE IMPRESSION OF FULL, NORMAL CONSULTATION WITH HIM AS TO EACH MAJOR POINT OF DECISION IN THE PAST.

-- TURNING TO NORTH AFRICA, SECRETARY KISSINGER WANTS YOU TO KNOW THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH REGRET IF THE SAHARA ISSUE ADVERSELY AFFECTED U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. WHETHER THINGS TAKE THIS COURSE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT DEPEND ENTIRELY OR EVEN MAINLY ON THE U.S.

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-- I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN TO YOU QUITE FRANKLY ABOUT HOW WE SEE THE SAHARA SITUATION AND OUR RELATION TO IT. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN IT, BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THAT IT CONTAINED THE POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE BOTH WITHIN THE REGION AND FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION.

-- AWARE OF THE DANGERS THAT COULD BE CAUSED BY A CONFRONTATION, THE U.S. STRONGLY URGED KING HASSAN NOT TO UNDERTAKE HIS GREEN

MARCH INTO THE SAHARA. WE SUPPORTED ALL OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS CALLING FOR THE MARCHES TO BE WITHDRAWN.

-- THE U.S. ALSO PLAYED NO ROLE WHATSOEVER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE NOVEMBER 14 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. SPAIN SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT WITH MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA FOR ITS OWN REASONS. ASSERTIONS THAT SPAIN ACTED UNDER U.S. PRESSURE ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT. WE HAD ALWAYS URGED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, WITHOUT HOWEVER TAKING A POSITION ON WHAT THE NATURE OF THAT SOLUTION SHOULD BE. WE WERE NOT CONSULTED ABOUT THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND, IN FACT, WERE UNAWARE OF ITS CONTENTS UNTIL AFTER IT WAS CONCLUDED. ANY PRESSURE SPAIN FELT CAME FROM THE MOROCCAN MARCH AND OUR INABILITY TO PERSUADE THE MOROCCANS NOT TO UNDERTAKE IT.

--. WITH THE SITUATION THAT FACED ALL THE STATES CONCERNED IN THE LIGHT OF SPAIN'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SAHARA, IT NEVERTHELESS SEEMED TO US THAT THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS LESS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING THAN OTHER POSSIBLE COURSES. IT WAS ONE OF THOSE SITUATIONS WITH NO IDEAL SOLUTION. WE DID BELIEVE, AS OUR UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE SHOWED, THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EFFORT TO LEARN THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE SAHARA, AND WE HAVE INDICATED AS MUCH TO KING HASSAN.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT A SITUATION NOW EXISTS IN WHICH KING HASSAN IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO HIS SAHARA POLICY. MOROCCAN PRESENCE IN THE SAHARA IS A REALITY THAT COULD BE REVERSED, IF AT ALL, ONLY THROUGH OPEN AND LARGE-SCALE WARFARE, A DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD ONLY HAVE THE MOST TRAGIC CONSEQUENCE FOR THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND FOR THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY. AMONG THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE QUESTION, WITH ALL THE RISKS THAT THAT ENTAILS.

-- WE HAVE THEREFORE FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST AND HOPE THE EFFORTS OF REGIONAL LEADERS AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE RESULTS SO FAR HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGING BUT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF ALL REQUIRE THAT SOME WAY BE FOUND TO THIS END.

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-- WITH THIS IN MIND I TALKED AT LENGTH WITH KING HASSAN. (DEPENDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE RABAT STOP, I WOULD SUGGEST SOME POSSIBLE OPENING, MAKING CLEAR I WAS NOT UNDERTAKING A MEDIATORY ROLE, OR SIMPLY EMPHASIZE THE EFFORTS I HAD MADE TO FIND ONE.)

-- ON THE MATTER OF OUR ARMS SUPPLIES FOR MOROCCO, WE FEEL THAT ALGERIA HAS CAUSE NEITHER FOR CONCERN NOR COMPLAINT. THE U.S. HAS NO DESIRE AND NO INTENTION TO ENCOURAGE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE REGION. OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL NOT CHANGE THE MILITARY BALANCE IN MOROCCO'S FAVOR, EVEN ASSUMING ALGERIA WERE ITSELF TO RECEIVE NO FURTHER STRENGTHENING. WE KNOW, MOREOVER, THAT ALGERIA HAS BEEN RECEIVING VERY SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN THE FACE OF THIS SITUATION, THE BASIS OF ALGERIA'S CONCERN ABOUT OUR MODEST, ON-GOING PROGRAM OF SUPPLY TO MOROCCO IS NOT CLEAR TO US. IT MUST

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FOR ATHERTON FROM SECRETARY

BE FRANK AND SAY THAT THIS PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE, BUT MANY
REPORTS HAVE GREATLY EXAGGERATED ITS SIZE.

-- ONE OF OUR CONCERNS IN THE SITUATION IS THAT IF ALGERIA SHOULD
PURSUE AND INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO ALTER THE COURSE OF EVENTS
IN THE SAHARA, AND PARTICULARLY IF THE CONFLICT WERE
INTERNATIONALIZED IN ANY WAY, OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT MIGHT NECESSARILY
BE INCREASED BEYOND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE. WE WOULD BE
DISTRESSED IN PARTICULAR AT THE DAMAGE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD
CAUSE TO THE US-ALGERIAN RELATIONSHIP, WHICH WE VALUE AND WHICH
WE CONSIDER TO BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

-- WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND WOULD NOT
WANT TO SEE AN EXACERBATION OF THE SAHARA SITUATION WHICH WOULD
ALMOST INEVITABLY AFFECT THE CLIMATE FOR TRADE AND COOPERATION.
END TEXT.

3. FOR HASSAN: BEGIN TEXT:

-- IT IS VERY GRACIOUS OF YOUR MAJESTY TO GRANT ME THIS
AUDIENCE. I RECALL WITH GREAT PLEASURE OUR CONVERSATION OF LAST
OCTOBER AND HAVE BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO THIS MEETING.
-- SECRETARY KISSINGER ASKED ME TO UNDERTAKE THIS MISSION BECAUSE
SITUATIONS ARE DEVELOPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
WHICH WILL BE IMPORTANT TO BOTH MOROCCO AND THE U.S. IN VIEW
OF OUR NORMAL PRACTICE OF CONSULTING PERIODICALLY, THE SECRETARY
HAS ASKED ME TO REVIEW ALL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST WITH YOUR
MAJESTY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE AS FULL AS POSSIBLE

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UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AT THIS TIME.

-- (AS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN IN SOME DETAIL WHERE MATTERS STAND IN THE WAKE OF RABIN'S VISIT, EMPHASIZING HOW WE ARE PROCEEDING AND MAKING CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT ACQUIESCE IN ISRAEL'S STRATEGY OF BUYING TIME THROUGH 1976. YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM SOME SENSE OF OUR STRATEGY TOWARD THE PLO. AS NOTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, YOU SHOULD STAGE THIS PART OF CONVERSATION SO THAT IT WILL BE SEEN AS YOUR FIRST PURPOSE IN COMING.)

-- TURNING TO THE SAHARA, ALTHOUGH FOR THE MOMENT ARMED CONFLICTS APPEAR TO HAVE SUBSIDED, THE RESULTS OF VARIOUS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE HAVE SO FAR BEEN DISAPPOINTING. WE FEAR THAT IF ALGERIA AND MOROCCO FAIL TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES, THIS WILL CREATE REGIONAL INSTABILITY WHICH IN TURN COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIETS, CUBANS, OR OTHER OUTSIDE ELEMENTS TO SERVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

-- I HAVE NOT COME HERE IN THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR OR TO PRESS ANY PARTICULAR SOLUTION OR APPROACH. THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE U.S. TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE CONCERNED AND INTERESTED PARTIES. WE BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE SETTLED ON A REGIONAL BASIS OR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE UN, AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO LEND OUR SUPPORT TO SUCH EFFORTS.

-- AS YOU KNOW, AFTER MOROCCO I WILL PROCEED TO ALGIERS WHERE I EXPECT TO JOIN WITH UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON IN TALKS WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ON A RANGE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES. THE ALGERIANS, IN ALGIERS AND WASHINGTON, HAVE CONVEYED TO US (AS THEY HAVE TO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM) THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITION THAT SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH SOME KIND OF REFERENDUM IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR THE SAHARA. IN MY TALK WITH BOUMEDIENE, I INTEND TO EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE FOR THE POLICY WE HAVE FOLLOWED AND SEEK A BETTER UNDERSTANDING BY THE ALGERIANS OF OUR POSITION. I WILL POINT OUT THE RISK TO ALGERIAN INTERESTS OF PURSUING A MILITANT COURSE OR OF ANY STEPS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE DISPUTE. I WILL ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WANT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA, BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR OLD FRIENDSHIP WITH YOUR MAJESTY.

-- MY REASON FOR SEEKING THIS AUDIENCE WITH YOU IS TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH OUR CONCERNS AND TO REQUEST YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

-- WE ARE HEARTENED BY YOUR OWN AND PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S
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RECENT DECLARATIONS THAT NEITHER OF YOUR COUNTRIES WILL DELIBERATELY

INITIATE HOSTILITIES OVER THE SAHARA QUESTION. HOWEVER, SO LONG AS THE MILITARY BUILD-UP CONTINUES ON BOTH SIDES AND SO LONG AS GUERRILLA WARFARE PERSISTS, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT AN UNPLANNED INCIDENT COULD TOUCH OFF GENERALIZED HOSTILITIES. SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE GREAT SUFFERING FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA AND WOULD DIVERT PRECIOUS RESOURCES FROM YOUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT NEEDS.

-- A PROLONGED CONFRONTATION, ENCOMPASSING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES, SUBVERSION TACTICS, AND THE INJECTION OF OUTSIDE ELEMENTS COULD HAVE EQUALLY INJURIOUS HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, AND COULD UNDERMINE THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER IN NORTH AFRICA.

-- WE KNOW FROM MR. KARIM LAMRANI'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT YOU ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SITUATION. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT ALGERIA, FRUSTRATED IN ITS CALL FOR A REFERENDUM, MAY INTERNATIONALIZE THE PROBLEM BY TURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, NORTH VIETNAM FOR MORAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE.

-- WE ALSO VIEW WITH GRAVITY SIGNS THAT BOUMEDIENE MAY BE THINKING OF ABANDONING HIS TACIT SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED MID-EAST SETTLEMENT AND OF MOVING INTO THE RADICAL ARAB CAMP AS A RESPONSE TO WHAT HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS TO BE A POLITICAL DEFEAT IN THE SAHARA. THE GROWING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ALGERIA AND LIBYA IS ONE DISTURBING INDICATION OF THIS.

-- IF THIS PROBLEM IS NOT SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION IN A MANNER WHICH IS AT LEAST PARTIALLY RESPONSIVE TO THE SENSITIVITIES OF ALL CONCERNED AND INTERESTED PARTIES, WE FEAR EVENTS WILL MOVE IN THE DIRECTION I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED.

-- WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE PERHAPS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT RECEIVED THE BACKING HE PROBABLY EXPECTED FROM MOST ARAB AND MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, MAY NOW BE SEEKING A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE, ALTHOUGH ALGERIAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH REFERENDUM APPEAR TO LEAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE, WE DO WONDER WHETHER THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN FULLY EXPLORED.

-- YOUR MAJESTY SAID WHEN I SAW YOU IN SEPTEMBER THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO FIND "AN ELEGANT SOLUTION" ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. IS THERE ANYTHING SPECIFIC YOU HAVE IN MIND?

-- THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION HAS WIDE POPULAR APPEAL AND ALGERIA WILL SURELY EXPLOIT THIS FACTOR TO THE
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UTMOST. U.S. PUBLIC ATTENTION IS BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF THE SAHARA PROBLEM JUDGING FROM RECENT INQUIRIES RECEIVED BY THE CONGRESS AND STATE DEPARTMENT.

-- AS SECRETARY KISSINGER INDICATED TO MR. LAMRANI, WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO MOROCCO, AND WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR PROBLEM IN THE SAHARA. WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE ARMS YOU FEEL YOU NEED AND TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF ARMS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS IMPORTANT IF TENSION INCREASES THAT

MOROCCO BE PORTRAYED IN OUR CONGRESS AS THE VICTIM OF AGRESSION
RATHER THAN FAILING TO CARRYOUT THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE
UNGA RESOLUTIONS ON THE SAHARA (AND PARTICULARLY THE RESOLUTION
FOR WHICH WE VOTED).

-- FOR THESE REASONS, I WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOUR MAJESTY
CAN TELL ME ABOUT YOUR THOUGHTSON HOW A FORMULA MAY BE WORKED
OUT WHICH WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO THE INTENT OF BOTH UN RESOLUTIONS.

END TEXT.

KISSINGER

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